Papers will be on, though not limited to, the following key themes:

• Historical and philosophical analysis of classical proofs for God’s existence within Islamic scholarship.
• Comparative studies on God’s definition, knowability and proof in Islam and other religious or philosophical traditions.
• The impact of modern philosophical developments, as well as those of science and cosmology, on traditional Islamic arguments for God’s existence.
• Critical examinations of contemporary atheistic challenges in the light of Islamic theological and philosophical responses.

Name	UK Time (BST)	Talk Title
DAY ONE
Ramon Harvey and Shoaib Ahmed Malik	11:30 AM – 12:00 PM	Introduction
Session 1: The Kalām Tradition
Zeynep Şeker (Sakarya University)	12:00 PM – 12:30 PM	The Muʿtazilah’s Classification of Accident (Aʿrāḍ) in Terms of Proving the Existence of God
Shoaib Ahmed Malik (University of Edinburgh)	12:30 PM – 1:00 PM	Breaking the Chain: Al-Rāzī’s Systematic Refutation of Infinite Regress
Ahmad Ataka (Universitas Gadjah Mada)	1:00 PM – 1:30 PM	The Sanusian Kalām Cosmological Argument: A Study of As-Sanusi’s ʿAqīda Trilogy on God’s Existence
Break	1:30 PM – 2:00 PM	–
Session 2: The Philosophical Tradition
Muhlise Yakşi (Marmara University)	2:00 PM – 2:30 PM	The Ontological Argument for God’s Existence in al-Fārābī’s Philosophy: Wujūd-Mawjūd Dichotomy as a Foundational Principle of Otherness
Mahdi Saatchi (Shahid Motahari University)	2:30 PM – 3:00 PM	Suhrawardī’s Self-Awareness Argument: A New Path in Proving the Existence of God
Amir Mohammad Emami (University of Exeter)	3:00 PM – 3:30 PM	How to Prove God Without Conceptions: Mīrzā Mahdī Iṣfahānī on the Arguments for the Existence of God
Break	3:30 PM – 4:00 PM	–
Session 3: Exploring Contingency and Causality
Ramon Harvey (Cambridge Muslim College)	4:00 PM – 4:30 PM	A Husserlian Transcendental Argument for the Causal Principle in Cosmological Arguments
David Solomon Jalajel (King Saud University)	4:30 PM – 5:00 PM	Causality in Arguments for God: The Logic of Subordinating Teleological Arguments to Cosmological Arguments in Sunnī Kalām
Nazir Khan (University of Nottingham/McMaster University)	5:00 PM – 5:30 PM	Ibn Taymiyya on the Arguments for God’s Existence from Origination and Contingency

Name	UK Time (BST)	Talk Title
DAY TWO
Session 1: Contemporary Analytic Reformulations
Nazif Muhtaroglu (Yale University)	12:00 PM – 12:30 PM	The Kalām Concept of God
Jamie B. Turner (University of Birmingham)	12:30 PM – 1:00 PM	An (Islamic) Abductive Moral Argument for God
Safaruk Zaman Chowdhury (Cambridge Muslim College)	1:00 PM – 1:30 PM	Prior Cognitive Information and an Islamic Argument from Reason
Break	1:30 PM – 2:00 PM	–
Session 2: Meta-methodological Concerns
Mehmet Bulgen (Marmara University) & Nursena Cetingul (Marma University)	2:00 PM – 2:30 PM	Classical Kalām and the Existence of God: Imam Al-Māturīdī’s Cumulative Arguments
Ibrahim Bahçi (Heinrich Heine University Düsseldorf) & Kübra Sümeyye Bahçi (İstanbul Medeniyet University)	2:30 PM – 3:00 PM	Bridging Rāzian Contingency Argument with Contemporary Nomological Arguments: Towards a Cumulative Contingency-Based Nomological Argument
Davlat Dadikhuda (LMU)	3:00 PM – 3:30 PM	Avicenna (with Dawānī and Lāhījī) on the Superiority of the Ṣiddīqīn
Break	3:30 PM – 4:00 PM	–
Session 3: Comparative Perspectives
Md Mosaddek Billah (Istanbul 29 Mayis University)	4:00 PM – 4:30 PM	Avicenna’s Thought on Proof of God (Īthbāt al-Wājib): Meister Eckhart’s Reception and Reinterpretation
Saida Mirsadri (University of Bonn)	4:30 PM – 5:00 PM	Between the Ideal and the Real: Iqbal on Reason, Experience, and Divine Reality
Logan David Siler (Independent Scholar)	5:00 PM – 5:30 PM	From Ethics to Experience: Levinas’s Infinite and Iqbal’s Panpsychism
Ramon Harvey and Shoaib Ahmed Malik	5:30 PM – 6:00 PM	Closing Remarks

Breaking the Chain: Al-Rāzī’s Systematic Refutation of Infinite Regress

This presentation offers the first dedicated study of Fakhr al-Dīn al-Rāzī’s (d. 1210) systematic refutation of infinite regress (ibṭāl al-tasalsul) in Al-Maṭālib al-ʿĀliyah, specifically in the tenth section of the first part of the first book. While previous scholarship has examined al-Rāzī’s engagement with contingency and necessity, his structured arguments against infinite regress have remained largely unexamined.

This study analyses al-Rāzī’s treatment of causal dependence by evaluating three possible explanations for the existence of contingent beings: (1) self-causation, (2) causation by a part of the contingent set, and (3) causation by an external cause. He systematically refutes the first two, demonstrating their logical impossibility, and substantiates (3) through a structured analysis of the seven arguments he employs to reject infinite regress, concluding that all contingencies must ultimately terminate in an external, necessary being (wājib al-wujūd). The study situates these arguments within their intellectual and historical context, particularly in relation to the Falsafī tradition, e.g., the possibility of an infinite number of rational souls (al-nufūs al-nāṭiqah).

Additionally, this study benefits from Afḍal al-Dīn al-Khūnajī’s (d. 1248) Talkhīṣ al-Maṭālib, which provides a systematic representation of al-Rāzī’s arguments, offering insights into how later scholars structured and interpreted his reasoning. Finally, it signals how aspects of al-Rāzī’s argumentation align with contemporary developments in cosmological arguments, thereby drawing a bridge between this medieval scholar with modern developments.

The Sanusian Kalam Cosmological Argument: A Study of As-Sanusi’s Aqidah Trilogy on God’s Existence

One of the most popular arguments to the existence of God in the last decade is arguably the Kalam cosmological argument. Since its reformulation by William Lane Craig, the argument has been highly debated in recent years. One of the main contentions surrounding the argument revolves around the premise that the universe begins to exist. While Al-Ghazali’s influence was acknowledged in Craig’s works, an in-depth study of the philosophical proofs supporting the claim that the universe begin to exist from the works of Muslim theologians (mutakallimun) themselves is still lacking, especially for an English-speaking audience. Given that this premise is the main contention between mutakallimun and their Islamic philosopher counterparts, the absence of this kind of study constitutes a significant gap in the literature.

To fill this gap, this paper will focus on the works of Muhammad bin Yusuf As-Sanusi, an influential 15th century Muslim theologian. The main contribution of this paper is to present a study of As-Sanusi’s arguments for the existence of God in his three major theological

works, namely Aqidah al-Shugra, Aqidah al-Wustha, and Aqidah al-Kubro. The paper will thoroughly explain the three arguments, namely the Argument from Emergent Accidents, The Argument from Change, and The Argument from Human Emergence. Although all three arguments are employed to prove the existence of a Beginningless God, each presents different strategy to prove the temporal beginning of the universe.

A comparative study will be presented to highlight the strength and weakness of each arguments in the modern context. The paper will show how each argument presented in As-Sanusi’s works is distinct from each other while at the same time they are also logically connected. It will also explore potential modern objections to the arguments and how As-Sanusi would potentially respond.

The Ontological Argument for God’s Existence in Al-Fārābī’s Philosophy: Wujūd-Mawjūd Dichotomy as a Foundational Principle of Otherness

In his attempt to philosophically elucidate the concept of being (al-wujūd), al-Fārābī, who systematically categorizes existing entities, asserts that the subject of Metaphysics is not God, but rather the absolute being (al-wujūd al-mutlaq). Consequently, he maintains that Metaphysics engages with all entities, including God. Within such an ontological framework, the proof of God’s existence is rendered possible by demonstrating the alterity of the ontological meaning of being as manifested in different entities. Furthermore, it is essential to substantiate the notion of God’s absolute otherness. This study aims to investigate the manner in which al-Fārābī articulates the absolute otherness of God by analyzing his conception of being as presented in his Book of Letters. The primary focus of this analysis will be the distinction between wujūd (being) and mawjūd (existent) unique to al-Fārābī’s ontological schema, as well as the differentiation between wujūd bi-dhatihi (being in itself) and wujūd bi-ghayrihi (being through other). Through this conceptual examination, it will be claimed that, in al-Fārābī’s ontology, abstract entities are ontologically distinct from physical entities in that they are not subject to the wujūd-mawjūd distinction. Furthermore, it will be asserted that within the realm of abstract entities, God is mawjūd bi-dhatihi (existence in itself) in a manner that differentiates Him from other abstract beings, thus undergoing an absolute distinct mode of existence. Consequently, it will be revealed that, by deepening the interpretation of the concept of being and demonstrating its various manifestations across different levels, al-Fārābī effectively establishes the proof of God’s existence and His absolute otherness.

Suhrawardi’s Self-Awareness Argument: A New Path in Proving the Existence of God

Traditionally, proofs of the existence of God are categorized into three types: ontological, cosmological, and teleological proofs. The Iranian-Islamic philosopher, Shihab al-Din Suhrawardi, in his most important work, “The Philosophy of Illumination,”(Ḥikmat al-Ishrāq) presents a proof of God’s existence that can be called the self-awareness argument for the existence of God, adding a new category of proofs, known as epistemological proofs, to the aforementioned three categories. While ontological proofs argue for God’s existence from the concept of being, cosmological proofs from the contingency and occurrence of the universe, and teleological proofs from the order and purpose of the cosmos, epistemological proofs argue from the existence of consciousness. Suhrawardi’s proof outwardly resembles the “necessity and contingency” proof, categorized as a cosmological proof. However, upon careful examination within the context of Suhrawardi’s metaphysics of light(ʿlm al-anwār), it is found that the starting point of this proof is not any existing being but rather self-aware being. Moreover, the process of arriving at this proof is not from a third-person perspective but from an inner, first-person perspective. Hence, this proof is found introspectively and expressed in the form of a proposition. Suhrawardi demonstrates how humans, by encountering their own self-awareness, necessarily arrive at the existence of a superior self-awareness that is inconceivable beyond it. Thus, Suhrawardi has found a new avenue of proofs, the statement of which can be summarized as follows: “I am self-aware; therefore, God exists.”

Beyond Conception: Mīrzā Mahdī Iṣfahānī’s Critique of Conceptualising God in Islamic Philosophical Theology

In classical Islamic philosophical theologies, particularly from Ibn Sina onwards, the existence of God is supposed to be proven through rational arguments presented in syllogistic forms consisting of major and minor premises under the influence of the Aristotelian logic. This approach results in demonstrations of the existence of God through concepts, such as the First Cause and the Necessary Being, that allegedly represent God from a certain aspect depending on the notion employed. Mīrzā Mahdī Iṣfahānī (b. 1303/1885 – d. 1365/1946), as the founder of the Maktab-i Tafkīk (the School of Separation), is a notable critic of falsafa, i.e. the Islamic adaptation of the Hellenistic philosophy, especially the Avicennian and the Ṣadrāian traditions, within the intellectual landscapes of Iran and Iraq over the past century. In his criticism of Islamic philosophical theologies, he objects to this method of proving the existence of God; his main concern being that it results in conceptualising the divine realm and violating the transcendence of God. In opposition, he maintains that God is essentially inconceivable because He is wholly other than what He creates, while mental conceptions can only represent created beings that are ontologically distinct from God. In his theological discussions, Iṣfahānī also argues for the existence of God based on the ontological dependence of beings, especially the human self, on the Creator. The difference, however, lies in two crucial dimensions: the metaphysical grounds upon which Iṣfahānī bases his arguments and the epistemological structure he adopts in formulating his ideas. Concerning the former, he opposes the Avicennian and Ṣadrāian views on causation, essence, and existence, and presents alternative ontological principles on each metaphysical subject. Regarding the latter, he introduces a distinctive account of religious epistemology that, in contrast with the rival epistemic framework, recognises the possibility of knowing God without mental conceptualisations. The intended outcome is a nuanced model for arguing for the existence of God based on created beings, perceived as signs that trigger the pregiven innate knowledge of God without the mediation of mental conceptions through syllogistic reasoning. This paper aims to investigate Iṣfahānī’s distinct approach to the topic of proofs for the existence of God with due consideration to the onto-epistemological framework he presents as opposed to dominant Islamic philosophical views.

Causality in arguments for God: The logic of subordinating teleological arguments to cosmological arguments in Sunnī Kalām

Cosmological and teleological arguments are both found in Sunnī Kalām works as proofs to arrive at knowledge of God. However, it has been observed by Harvey (2021) and others that teleological arguments play a supporting role to cosmological arguments, with the latter not only setting the foundation for knowledge of God’s existence, but also serving as stage 2 arguments for asserting a number of His essential attributes. Only then do the teleological arguments come and hone in on specific aspects of God’s nature to provide a fuller picture of God that the mutakallim seeks to assert. The purpose of this paper is to reveal and map out the underlying syllogistic logic of this approach, implicit in the Kalām works, and show how the causal implications of the cosmological arguments allow for more robust teleological arguments, since the cosmological arguments provide, in addition to assertions about God and His attributes, a fundamental negation of metaphysical causal autonomy for natural processes. Erlwein (2019) has shown that one cannot assume the intent behind a proof for God must be to establish His existence, since it can be wielded to argue for His attributes, and particularly to assert His divine action by demonstrating the metaphysical insufficiency of natural causes. Mihirig (2022) shows she overstates her case, and the present article does not seek to negate the intention of establishing God’s existence for all Kalām proofs. However, this paper argues that when teleological arguments in Sunnī Kalām are used supportively, they are not, as often assumed, trying to refute the claim that natural causal processes are sufficient to account for the phenomena in question. They presuppose the metaphysics of an externally-caused world and argue that, for such a world, various features are only possible if its external cause possesses certain attributes. Used in this way, teleological arguments are not vulnerable to the danger of natural causally closed pathways being discovered that provide a full naturalistic account for the phenomena, nor do those arguments need to counter such claims to be persuasive. The robustness of these arguments will be shown through a case study where al-Rāzī uses teleology to establish God’s volition, and from there, the temporal occurrence of the world, reversing the order of conclusions in the classical KCA, on the strength of the cosmological contingency argument, which has already established God’s creativity and negated metaphysical causal autonomy for the world.

Ibn Taymiyya on the arguments for God’s existence from origination and contingency

This paper examines the response of Ibn Taymiyya (d. 728/1328) to the specific formal proofs for God’s existence popularized in post-classical Islamic thought. While recent scholarship has identified important features of Ibn Taymiyya’s epistemological system, his nuanced evaluation of arguments from origination (ḥudūth) and contingency (imkān) remains unstudied, leading to conflicting representations of his stance. Challenging simplistic portrayals of Ibn Taymiyya as wholly embracing or rejecting philosophical proofs, this paper demonstrates his critique, adaptation, and reconfiguration of elements of these arguments within his own epistemological framework. Drawing on his magnum opus Darʾ taʿārruḍ al-ʿaql wal-naql, the paper analyzes Ibn Taymiyya’s critique of four classical arguments, based on the origination or contingency of bodies or attributes. While rejecting the evidentialist requirement for belief in God and the epistemic utility of syllogistic reasoning, Ibn Taymiyya affirms that the core intuition behind these arguments—creation’s dependency on a Creator—is a form of necessary knowledge. His disagreements stem from the physical and metaphysical assumptions underpinning these arguments, such as atomism, hylomorphism, and the division between essence and existence. Despite critiquing the theological consequences of certain arguments, Ibn Taymiyya affirms the merits of the argument from the origination of attributes, especially as articulated by al-Ashʿarī in his example of human development. After rectifying its contentious elements, he reconfigures it into an inference from observed origination, rooted in empirical signs (āyāt) in creation. He finds precedent for this approach in a tradition concerning the Prophet’s companions. This reconfiguration aligns with the broader tenets of Ibn Taymiyya’s epistemology and theology, privileging a conception of the Divine attributes that accords with an Atharī traditionalist reading of the Qur’anic scripture. By exploring Ibn Taymiyya’s critique and reconstruction of these arguments, the paper highlights his sophisticated engagement with philosophical theology and his contributions to Islamic epistemology.

The Kalām Concept of God

In my previous work, I outlined the structure of al-Bāqillānī’s argument for God’s existence in Kitāb al-Tamhīd. His methodology integrates the cosmological argument from temporal origination (dalīl al-ḥudūth), the cosmological argument from contingency (dalīl al-imkān), and the teleological argument to infer the existence of an eternal (qadīm) and volitional agent (al-fāʿil al-mukhtār). To establish divine uniqueness, the argument from mutual hindrance (dalīl al-tamānuʿ) is also employed.

These interconnected arguments collectively build toward the concept of a unique, eternal, and volitional agent, whom al-Bāqillānī ultimately identifies as God (Allāh). This progression exemplifies a meta-argument, synthesizing multiple sub-arguments into a cohesive framework, reflecting a systematic methodology in kalām.

This paper seeks to advance the understanding of the kalām conception of God by further analyzing al-Bāqillānī’s meta-argument. To achieve this, I apply Saul Kripke’s distinction between definition-giving and reference-fixing descriptions. The mutakallimūn’s characterization of God as the “unique, volitional, eternal agent” does not attempt to define His essence, which is considered unknowable. Instead, it functions as a reference-fixing description, grounding the concept of God in His observable actions within the universe.

By situating al-Bāqillānī’s methodology within this philosophical framework, the paper underscores the intellectual rigor of kalām reasoning, demonstrating how seemingly distinct arguments coalesce into a coherent theological framework. Additionally, it demonstrates how contemporary analytic tools offer valuable insights that enhance our understanding of the systematic and interconnected nature of kalām thought.

An (Islamic) Abductive Moral Argument for God

Although the moral argument for Godís existence has occupied an important place within the history of Western philosophy, its evidential value seems to have been somewhat overlooked within the Islamic tradition. This is intriguing partly because Muslim theologians have traditionally upheld a divine command theory (DCT) of metaethics, often seen as a central backdrop for the argument. This paper thus attempts to reconsider the moral argument within the Islamic tradition, at least insofar as it draws inspiration from that tradition to defend some of its key premises and contentions. However, unlike the traditional DCT approach toward the moral argument, this paper aims to outline a moral argument for theism that does not rest on the assumption of DCT; rather, it seeks to draw on the Islamic tradition to defend the idea that God best explains the existence of non-reductive, non-natural moral facts that we have access to through moral intuition.

Specifically, the paper draws on a range of Islamic thinkers in establishing, first, the notion that moral facts are non-reductive and non-natural, and that these moral facts can be known through a kind of moral intuition. Second, the argument presses the point that these moral facts are objective and necessarily true. Third, it argues that theism best explains our capacity for reliable moral intuitions. And, finally, in drawing on a recent proposal to solve the ‘gap-problem’ in the context of cosmological arguments, the argument here makes a similar move by arguing that theism best explains these moral facts because it accounts for why they’re necessarily true. Specifically, it argues that the existence of a maximally perfect beingósuch as understood in the Islamic tradition explains why they exist necessarily

because such a being can both metaphysically ground such facts and that it must exist in all possible worlds.

Prior Cognitive Information and an Islamic Argument from Reason

In contemporary philosophy of religion, Arguments from Reason (AFR) have been advanced to challenge philosophical naturalism’s ability to account for human cognitive faculties. This paper proposes for the first time an Islamic iteration of AFR, termed the Argument from Prior Cognitive Information (APCI), which asserts that human thinking requires an antecedent set of cognitive information to process new experiences and make meaningful judgments. While naturalists accept that cognition depends on external reality, sensory perception, and neural processing, they often overlook the necessity of prior cognitive input that bridges perception and comprehension. According to the APCI proposed here, naturalistic explanations fail to account for the origins of this prior cognitive information, as human teaching, non-human animals, inanimate nature, chance, or evolutionary processes cannot plausibly explain the initial cognitive framework necessary for rational thought. In contrast, the argument finds theological grounding in Qur’ān 2:31, which describes God teaching Prophet Adam the “names of all things”, suggesting a divine impartation of fundamental knowledge. Thus, the best explanation for the origins of prior cognitive information is a transcendent, intelligent, and pedagogically capable agent—God. This paper engages with key objections to the argument, including potential naturalistic alternatives such as panpsychism, and assesses their explanatory adequacy. By grounding APCI within both philosophical discourse and Islamic theological thought, this argument offers a novel contribution to the literature on the existence of God.

Bridging Rāzian Contingency Argument and Contemporary Nomological Arguments: Towards A Cumulative Contingency-Based Nomological Argument

This paper develops Fakhr al-Dīn al-Rāzī’s argument from the contingency of properties (dalīl min imkān aṣ-ṣifāt) and connects it to contemporary nomological arguments. Al-Rāzī through his novel conceptualization of possibility (imkān), expanded the principle of sufficient reason beyond the mere existence of objects to encompass their properties and essences. This foundational idea, termed the argument from contingency of properties, posits that not only the existence of the world (‘ālam) but also its specific properties and features require an external cause. Another formulation of this argument is the argument from specification (dalīl at-taḫṣīṣ), which asserts that the contingent distribution of properties necessitates a cause that determines and actualizes these properties in natural objects. Building on al-Rāzī’s framework, this paper aims to extend the classical concept of contingency to the realm of laws of nature or more generally law-like regularities in nature. This leads to a contingency-based nomological argument in which the striking fact that calls for explanation is not separately contingency at all or merely regularity, but contingent (law-like) regularities.

The study proceeds in two stages. First, it elucidates al-Rāzī’s argument from contingency of properties and its application to the distribution of properties in the natural world. Second, it explores a neo-Rāzīan extension of this argument to nomological arguments (e.g. general nomological argument, arguments from nomological harmony, and fine-tuning type arguments) connecting it to contemporary philosophical debates in analytic philosophy of religion, metaphysics and philosophy of science. The core aim is to highlight the contingency aspect underlying various nomological arguments and reformulate them within the Rāzīan

framework of the contingency argument. By situating nomological arguments within the concept of contingency, this paper seeks to strengthen their metaphysical foundation and demonstrate their explanatory robustness.

Avicenna (with Dawānī and Lāhījī) on the superiority of the siddiqin

In several places, Avicenna urges that his proof of God’s existence – the demonstration of the truthful (siddiqin) – is superior to the alternatives on offer from both the kalām (argument from origination (huduth)) and falsafa (argument from motion (haraka)) traditions. In this article, I unpack and defend this claim by drawing on the insights of Dawānī and Lāhījī (two post-Avicennian philosophers) on the matter. I will argue that the Avicennian argument enjoys several formal and material explanatory advantages over its competitors. On the formal level, the siddiqin, unlike the huduth and haraka arguments, relies on fewer inferential premises, is a priori, and amounts to a demonstration-why. The formal efficiency of Avicenna’s argument, Dawānī states, demonstrates its superior logical rigor and economy. On the material level, Avicenna’s argument provides a more robust conclusion about the nature of the divine. For unlike the kalām argument, which argues for a first eternal cause, and the Aristotelian argument from motion, which seeks to establish an unmoved mover, the Avicennian proof culminates in the existence of a necessary being. Building on Avicenna’s remarks, Lāhījī contends that while both the huduth and haraka arguments successfully establish some entity, they fail to show that it is not a contingent entity. According to the Shaykh, this necessary being, which is not only the first cause but also ontologically self-sufficient, embodies the most proper conception of divinity. Thus, by directly arriving at a necessary being, the siddiqin, I argue, provides a truer and more profound metaphysical foundation for an Islamic conception of monotheism.

Avicenna’s Thought on Proof of God (Īthbāt al-wājib): Meister Eckhart’s Reception and Reinterpretation

This study examines medieval German theologian Meister Eckhart’s reception of Avicenna’s Proof of God (Īthbāt al-wājib) particularly focusing on the concept of existence. In the Prologus Generalis section of his work Opus Tripartitum, Eckhart equates existence (esse) with God (Deus), proposing that everything emanates from the absolute existence of God. In this regard, the ontological structure of existence reflects the eternal and immutable nature of God, which Eckhart examines through the lens of Avicenna’s concept of wājib al-wujūd (necessary existence). Eckhart argues that God, as existence itself (das Sein an sich) encompasses everything and that everything originates from Him. He also refers to

Avicenna’s analogies while illustrating the essence of a being stripped of specific qualities, emphasizing that its existence does not depend on any particular traits. According to Eckhart, the essence (māhiyyah) of a being is what determines its nature. Essence refers to the fundamental attributes that define something and distinguish it from others. For instance, the essence of a human being is their nature as a rational and mortal being. These attributes are part of the definition of a human and constitute their essence. Additionally, Eckhart engages with Avicenna’s exploration of existence and the oneness of God as elaborated in the Metaphysics of the Book of the Healing or of the Book of the Cure (Ilāhiyyāt of Kitāb al-Šifā). This foundational work particularly influenced Eckhart’s theological reflections, especially his understanding of existence as unified and absolute. In this context, alongside Avicenna, Eckhart frequently quotes Islamic philosophers and incorporates their interpretations in his Parisian Questions and other Latin works. This study aims to meticulously trace and analyze Eckhart’s reception of Avicenna’s ‘‘Proof of God’’ during the medieval period and its subsequent reinterpretation within a Trinitarian framework, while also addressing the resulting theological bifurcations.

Between the Ideal and the Real: Iqbal on Reason, Experience, and Divine Reality

The renowned 20th-century Muslim philosopher Muhammad Iqbal (1877-1938), in his seminal work The Reconstruction of Religious Thought in Islam (1930), critically engages with classical proofs for the existence of God, offering a modern alternative rooted in his philosophical framework of the “self” (khudī). While acknowledging the historical significance of traditional arguments such as the cosmological, teleological and ontological proofs, Iqbal critiques their limitations in addressing the experiential and dynamic aspects of faith and divine reality.

Iqbal’s primary critique targets classical rationalism, which underpins these traditional proofs. He argues that they rely on static and abstract reasoning, disconnected from lived human experience and the evolving nature of reality. For instance, he contends that cosmological and teleological arguments depend on mechanistic worldviews that fail to capture the essence of divine creativity and omnipresence. Similarly, he critiques the ontological argument for its reliance on purely conceptual reasoning, suggesting that such a priori approaches may appeal to abstract, intellectual frameworks but fall short in resonating with the dynamic nature of human understanding and experience of the divine.

For Iqbal, the ultimate proof for God’s existence lies not in abstract reasoning but in personal, introspective experience. His alternative argument is deeply grounded in his philosophy of the self, wherein, through a method akin to Cartesian introspection, the individual discovers their “self” or the Fichtean “ego” (khudī) and through it, the “Ultimate Ego/Khudī” or God. By emphasizing the self, Iqbal not only engages with the “anthropological turn” of modern Western philosophy but also advocates for a reconstructed metaphysics that integrates the

insights of modern science, particularly physics and biology. This framework envisions God as compatible with a dynamic, continuously evolving and expanding universe.

From Ethics to Metaphysics: Levinas’s Infinite and Iqbal’s Cosmo-Panpsychism

This article will explore how the thought of Emmanuel Levinas and Muhammad Iqbal can work in tandem to strengthen ontological and teleological proofs for God, which, according to Iqbal, fall short because they reduce thought as something external rather than foundational component of being. These arguments for God, he says, maintain significance if they can be reconceptualized in a way that centers thought (or experience), as the ultimate ground at the very essence of the nature of things. Levinas’s thought can be utilized as a starting point for locating this internalization of thought. The Infinite, for him, is most obvious in the face of the Other. In acknowledging the Infinite within another, we are also acknowledging the Infinite within ourselves—since from the Other’s view, they are the subject and I am the Other which indicates the Infinite. It is the Infinite that I see in the Other that indicates the Greater Infinite, which is synonymous with God. To supplement this, Iqbal’s thought offers a cosmo-panpsychist framework that further the reinvigorates this model on a metaphysical level. In other words, the ethical philosophy of Levinas can be used as a means of arriving at a recognition of the Greater Infinite and Iqbal’s relational cosmo-panpsychist metaphysics can then be used to construct an “internal scaffolding” for subjective experience (the Infinite within ourselves and others) that provides a means by which to challenge reductive materialism and strengthen ontological and teleological proofs for God.

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